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I. Introduction
Recent theoretical advances in the Industrial Organization literature have
provided insight into modelling the demand for differentiated products.
Lancaster (1979) introduced and developed what he termed the "Characteristics
Approach" to modelling the demand for differentiated products, while Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) pioneered what has come to be known as the "Love of Variety"
approach to the subject. Both of these approaches have been applied to
international trade theory. The result has been a heightened awareness of the
role that product differentiation plays in trade theory. This work is
presented in Helpman and Krugman (1985).
There have thus far been relatively few empirical applications of the new
theories of trade. In this paper, I present a new technique for
econometrically estimating the demand for differentiated products. I adopt a
Lancasterian approach to product differentiation and use theoretical results
from this approach to solve several empirical problems. I then apply the
technique to the demand for automobiles.
The estimates derived from this method allow me to analyze many trade and
industrial policies for the U.S. automobile industry. For example, what would
be the effect of a tariff applied only to Japanese imports on the total
automobile import demand? Would domestically produced auto sales replace the
Japanese imports or might German and Swedish imports rise, leaving total
imports relatively constant? Some economists have argued for a tariff on all
small foreign cars. Such a tax does not discriminate by country of origin and
hence is viewed more kindly by GATT. As foreign small cars became more costly,
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would domestic car sales rise substantially or would the U.S. just trade
imports of small cars for imports of larger cars? Optimal industrial policy -
toward the U.S. auto industry may involve subsidies to domestic producers
thereby possibly lowering the price of domestic autos.' Or perhaps government
policy may involve subsidizing only one producer (e.g. Chrysler). What effects
would these policies have on demand for different types of foreign and domestic
automobiles?
All of these questions are, in a formal sense, quite similar. Each
considers the effect of a tax placed on a subset of a group of differentiated
products. Parameters needed to answer questions such as those posed above are
own and appropriately-defined cross price elasticities of demand. Any analysis
of the taxation of differentiated products must estimate (or use existing
estimates of) these demand elasticities. The approach developed in this paper
provides a utility-consistent technique for deriving these elasticities. While
I apply the methodology to issues of trade and industrial policy in the U.S.
automobile industry, I believe that the general approach will have wider
application. The methodology could, for example, be used to estimate demand
elasticities in other differentiated products industries such as
microcomputers, audio-video equipment, lumber, and steel. All of these
industries have been the subject of recent policy debate.
This paper is a first attempt at solving some of the empirical issues
associated with the analysis of taxation of differentiated products. While the
paper provides some answers, it also raises a number of microeconomic and
econometric issues for future research.
In Section II, I provide a brief critical review of the literature.
Section III develops the methodology that is then applied in Section IV. Using
2
the aemana system estimates in section iv, Section V addresses many of the
policy concerns posed in this introduction. Section VI concludes the paper
with a brief summary.
II. A Brief Summary of the Literature
In theory, estimating the demand system for a set of differentiated
products is no different than estimating a decand system for several homogenous
products. A typical estimated equation in such a system would regress quantity
of a good demanded on its own price, the prices of the other differentiated or
homogenous products, and several other variables such as income and personal
and demographic characteristics. Food is a good example of a set of
differentiated products whose demand functions are nicely estimated by standard
techniques. Recent work based on Deaton and iuellbauer's Almost Ideal Demand
System provide excellent examples of this approach. 2
For many sets of differentiated products, though, standard techniques are
inapplicable. In the case of automobiles, there are over 100 models available
and few models are available for more than four consecutive years. The
standard techniques would imply a system of, say, 100 equations with 99 cross
price effects. With so few years of data, the system is not estimable with any
degree of accuracy. In the case of VCRs or micro-computers, technology changes
so quickly that no more than two or three years of data is likely to be
available.
Several approaches to these problems have been taken in the empirical
literature. Almost all of them have been applied to the automobile industry--
at least partially because data is relatively plentiful. I will accordingly
focus on this body of research.
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The easiest way around the problems posed by product differentiation is to
ignore the issue. Not surprisingly, this was the approach first adopted. Work
by Suits in 1958 used time series of total quantity of autos sold, average auto
price, and real disposable income to arrive at aggregate demand elasticities.
While it is surely unfair to judge the econometric methods of 30 years ago by
the standards permitted by today' s computing technology, Suits' approach is
incapable of addressing the issues raised in this paper's introduction.
Surprisingly, research as recent as Toder (1978) uses elasticities imputed in
part from Suit's original work, when analyzing current automobile trade and
industrial policy. Tarr and Morkre (1984) and Dixit (1986) in turn use
elasticities derived from Toder.
Time series techniques, even modern ones, are not applicable to
investigating the effects of trade policy in the U.S. automobile industry. This
is because both products and tastes have changed significantly over the period
of estimation (approximately the last 20 years.) A 1965 Toyota is not the same
car as a 1985 Toyota. As Toyotas change, the meaning of a single (constant)
elasticity of demand for Toyotas becomes unclear. Tastes for autos and the
characteristics which comprise them have also changed. While it may be
theoretically possible to control for the reputation effects and network
externalities that are responsible for this shift of tastes, it is not easy to
do so in practice.
The most recent comprehensive study of the U. S. demand for automobiles is
reported in Toder et. al.'s Trade Policy and the U.S. AutomobileIndustry.. In
that book, demand elasticities are estimated using three methodologies. As
most studies of the welfare effects of trade policy in the auto industry have
used elasticity estimates from Toder, it is worthwhile to take a close look at
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these alternative approaches. Each will be discussed in turn.
Toder's first approach is a time-series analysis. This work is more
sophisticated than earlier work in that it introduces hedonic price indices.
Toder estimates the following regression:
FIn (--) = a + a ln( Pf
DP= 0 1 2
d
-- is the foreign to domestic auto sales ratio.
Pf
-g--is the ratio of foreign to domestic hedonic prices.
d
Z is a vector of exogenous variables.
The estimation uses annual data from 1960 to 1974. Estimates of
a ranged from -0.9 to -1.7, depending on the Z vector. The coefficient ac
is the elasticity-of substitution in demand. Using the estimate of
a1 and older estimates of total market demand elasticities, conventional price
elasticities of demand can be derived.
There are at least four problems with this approach. First, as mentioned
above, tastes seem to have changed over time, since casual empiricism suggests
that a foreign car in 1960 was viewed very differently than one in 1974. As
tastes vary over time, the economic relevance of the estimates of the
elasticity of substitution in demand is called into question. Second, older
estimates of the total market elasticity of demand are required to convert
Toder's results into standard price elasticities of demand. While Toder used
hedonic price indices, the older studies did not. As cars are not homogenous
products, it is unclear exactly what the results of the older studies by Suits
and others mean. Also, the older studies were conducted before auto imports
were an empirically relevant phenomenon. Using these older out-of-sample
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market elasticities to derive the standard elasticities of demand may yield
very misleading results. Third, even if the time-series would yield accurate
estimates, the agglomeration of all foreign carsprevents the analysis of taxes
applied to only a subset of foreign autos. Fourth, regressing relative demands
on relative hedonic prices does not follow from either a -Lancasterian or Dixit-
Stiglitz model of product differentiation. The choice of using relative
demands and relative prices of domestic and foreign goods allows Toder, like
all his predecessors, to estimate a single equation instead of a complete
demand system. Toder's implicit assumption that an otherwise homogenous good
is differentiated only by country of origin is termed the Arrnington Assumption.
This assumption makes little sense from a consumer theory viewpoint, unless
there is some basis for supposing that goods are homogenous within countries
but not across countries. Toder's first approach is, then, a utility
inconsistent approach to modelling demand for differentiated products.
Toder's second method employed a cross-sectional approach to the demand-
estimation problem. Toder used transport costs to introduce cross-sectional
price variation. The units of observation were each of the continental United
States. Here the regression- estimated was:
F f
-D- = a0 + al(-P + a 2 PC2029 + a 3 PCI + a4PGAS
d
where: --- is the ratio of foreign to domestic new car sales.
Pf
-P-- is the ratio of delivered foreign to domestic list prices.
d
PC2029 is the percentage of population between ages 20 and 29.
PGAS is the price of gasoline.
While the problems of time varying parameters are not present in this
cross-sectional approach, this method still relies on previously derived market
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elasticities to construct conventional price elasticities of demand. The
cross-sectional methodology yielded generally unsatisfactory results. This is
not surprising, since one might suspect that variables other than transport
costs, gasoline costs, per capita income, and the percentage of population in
their 20's explain why foreign cars are more predominant.in New Jersey or
California than they are in Michigan or Indiana.
Toder's third approach is by far the most innovative. Although
computationally complex, the intuition behind this methodology--termed a
hedonic market share model-- is straightforward.
The model requires only one year's data on sales, list prices and
characteristics of automobiles. Let {a } be the -set of marginal rates of
n
substitution between N characteristics and price. Toder et. al. posit a log-
normal distribution of {a } across consumers. Next, they estimate
coefficients,O , which form a vector of sufficient statistics for the
probability distribution of the a's. Let S be the vector of actual shares of
auto sales by model. They next choose 0 to maximize the likelihood of
observing S. In brief, the technique selects statistics describing a
distribution of consumer's utility functions that reproduce as nearly as
possible the actual market shares observed.
Toder et. al. then apply the estimated taste distribution to a new set of
available models (differing from the old set by price) to generate a new market
share distribution. In this sense, the model simulates the relevant
elasticities. Unlike the previous two approaches, the hedonic market share
model can, in principle, predict market share elasticities for any subset of
models. In practice only a elasticity of substitution in demand between all
foreign and all domestic cars is estimated. This yielded coefficients of -2.3
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and -2.1 depending on the price increase simulated.
There are at least three major problems with this approach--the first two
of which are related.
1. The model is computationally quite difficult. Toder uses five
characteristic variables to estimate the taste distribution. Calculating the
maximum likelihood estimates for 5 requires a fifth-order numerical integration
between each iteration of the likelihood function maximization. The cost of
such computational techniques is often prohibitive. Also, some experts at
numerical analysis question the accuracy of such a high order integration of a
complicated distribution function.
2. More importantly, this technique does not yield standard errors. For
policy analysis, point estimates without standard errors are of limited use.
Without the standard errors, it is impossible to know whether and how well the
data fit the model.
3. The results of this technique hinge critically on the choice of the
distribution function of tastes. Toder et. al. used a log-normal distribution.
The choice of the distribution function is completely arbitrary yet possibly
key to the results. While all non-robust estimation methods are subject to
this critique, the problem is compounded here by the lack of standard errors of
the estimates. Without the standard errors, it is especially difficult to
ascertain whether the distribution function of tastes chosen fits the model.
Bresnahan (1981) also models the demand for automobiles. Using
sophisticated econometric techniques, he accounts for product differentiation
and avoids the pitfalls of time-series analysis. His goal, though, is more
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ambitious than just a model of automobile demand, as he focuses on the issue of
departures from marginal cost pricing in the automobile industry. Because he
looks at a broader range of issues than just the demand side of the model, his
results are not disaggregated enough to analyze the questions posed in the
introduction of this paper. While he does not estimate elasticities, per se,
estimated parameters can be manipulated to give an industry demand elasticity
(a proportionate change of all prices) of .25 and an elasticity for the average
product (one price changes and all others are constant) of 3.2. Bresnahan is
very forthright about the quite restrictive assumptions that he requires on the
demand side of his model. The most serious of these is the assumption that the
density of consumer tastes is uniform (as opposed to Toder's log-normal
assumption.) Bresnahan' s methodology also is computationally complex and, like
Toder's hedonic market-share model, it does not yield estimates of standard
errors. Bresnahan, though, approximates the variances of parameter estimates
in four ways. Although variances depend on the approximation used, this does
give some feel for how well the data fit the model. In short, Bresnahan's
method is carefully developed, but it is not suitable for addressing the types
of issues raised in the introduction of this paper.
Finally, there are a number of studies of automobile demand that
investigate the question of whether or not a car is purchased at all, and if
so, how many are purchased. These studies are fairly common in mode-of-
transportation studies. Methods used range from simple logit to multinomial
logit to multinomial probit. A quite technically sophisticated example of this
approach is found in Train (1986).* These studies ask a set of questions that
are for the most part only tangentially related to questions about the demand
effect of taxes on differentiated products. As such, their results are not
very useful to the issues with which I am concerned.*
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III. Methodology.
In this section, I explain my approach to the estimation of demand for
differentiated products. I do this in two steps. In step 1, I derive a demand
function that I wish to estimate. I avoid many of the pitfalls of previous
approaches by relying on results from Lancasterian consumer theory. In step 2,
I explain how the insights offered by Lancasterian consumer theory are
empirically implemented.
Step 1: I avoid the problems associated with time-series analysis by
using only three years of data--1983 to 1985.5 Three years of time-series
data, though, leaves few degrees of freedom. I introduce the much needed
additional price quantity variation by using a cross section of (the same) 100
models of automobiles for each year. The data, then are a time-series cross
section, or panel, consisting of 300 observations.'
While using panel data instead of only time-series introduces additional
price-quantity variation, it also poses some problems. It may be wrong to
regress quantity on price since, across observations, the good is not the same.
I address these problems using results from the Characteristics Approach to
product differentiation.
In the Lancasterian model of product differentiation, a good is
represented by its bundle of characteristics. Different models of the good
contain different bundles of these characteristics. With this view of product
differentiation, as tastes vary across consumers, demands for a model, given
its price, will vary with the model's characteristics bundle. Because products
are identified by their bundle of characteristics, it is appropriate to control
for the cross sectional variation in models by including in the demand function
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those characteristics which differentiate models.
Lancaster hence posits that the quantity demanded of a model depends on
its own price and characteristics and on the =rice and characteristics of
competing models. In log-linear form, this izplies:
In Q = a + a1ln P. + a ln . +'X + t 'X
it 1 it 2 jt it jt
where: Qi is the quantity demanded of model i in year t.
P.tis the price of model i in year t.
P. is the vector of prices of substitutes to a model with sales Qi.it it
X. is a characteristics vector of model i in year t.it
Xjt is a characteristics vector of model j in year t.
I posit that the above model may be subject to country-of-origin specific
errors, and hence use a fixed effects model. Allowing also for time dependent
shifts of demand gives:
in Q = a + a ln P. + a 1nP. +O'X + r'X, + a3JAPAN. + a GERMAN.+
it 0 + 1 it 2 jt it jt 3 4G i
+ a SWEDE.+ a' T (1A)5 i 6t
where: JAPAN. = 1 if model i is Japanese.
GERMAN. = 1 if model i is German.
1
SWEDE. = 1 if model i is Swedish.
1
Tt is a time dummy for year t.
-Equation (1A) is consistent with a Lancasterian approach to consumer demand for
autos..
Somewhat surprisingly, Lancaster' s work does not discuss the hedonic price
literature. This literature posits that the price of a good is a linear
combination of the implicit prices of the attributes of' the good. Thus in
equation (1A), Xi, would be highly collinear with P±,. An analogous
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relationship holds for X,t and P,. According to the hedonic approach, the
price of a good already contains information about the qualities of the good.
Hence, estimating (lA) merely introduces severe multicollinearity. Instead,
the hedonic hypothesis argues in favor of estimating the following demand
function.
In Q = a + a ln P. + a ln? . + a JAPAN. + a GERMAN. + a SWEDE. + a'T (1B)it1 2 it 2 jt 3 1 4 i 5 i 6t
I econometrically consider equations (lA) and (1B). In both, I assume the
consumer takes as given all independent variables.
The functional form of the demand function should follow from the density of
consumers over characteristics space. Formally, demand for a model is given by
integrating the density of consumers over the neighborhood of the model.
Making the link between distribution of consumers to functional form of demand
is a difficult question that I do not address. Rather, I consider equations
(lA) and (1B) as convenient statistical approximations of demand.
In standard consumer theory, with 100 models, 99 models could serve as
substitutes for model i, and thus 99 prices would appear in P,. This would
imply 9900 cross price terms to be estimated in the standard demand system.
This is not feasible with only 3 years of data. Again, I rely on the theory of
product differentiation to, in effect, place many zero restrictions on the
vector a2'
The earliest work on product differentiation by Hotelling (1929) arranged
products along a line. In Figure 1, model B competes for customers with models
A and C, but not with any other models.
. . Figure 1.
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Here, models A and C are termed "neighbors" of model B, whereas the other
models (D, E, etc.) were not. Were there 100 models arranged along the
spectrum, this set-up would imply 97 zero restrictions on the vector a2 for
good B. Only the price of B and the prices of its neighbors, A and C, would
enter the demand function for B.
Lancaster extends the Hotelling model to allow products to differ across
more than one dimension. Lancaster posits that'each good is a bundle of
several characteristics. In this case, if there are n products, each product
may have up to n-1 neighbors and all have at least one neighbor. 8 I rely on
the Lancasterian approach to product differentiation to endogenously determine
which products compete with each other for consumers. This, in turn, allows me
to place zero restrictions on a2 in a utility-consistent manner.
Step 2: Empirically determining the neighbors for each product is
complicated by the fact that while characteristics of the goods are observed,
individual consumer tastes over these characteristics are not. I adopt an
approach to this problem that is based in part on a methodology developed by
Feenstra (1986).9,o
The first task in any Lancasterian model is to define the metric in
characteristics space that is to be used to determine how far apart any two
products are. To.this end, let x = (x 1 , x2 , ... xn) > 0 be a vector of
physical characteristics which differ across models and Xn be the
n-dimensional space in which products are differentiated. Let
e = (9, 92' ''' en) represent the vector of taste parameters for a particular
individual.
I assume that all individuals have the same form of utility function,
namely CES, but that individuals differ in their vector of tastes 9. Then, an
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individual's utility is given by:aa
n a
U(x,) =.i eix. (2)
i=1 i i




The twin constraints of utility increasing in x and concavity of utility in x
imply a e (0, -1). This range of a is perhaps overly restrictive for the case
of substitutability of auto characteristics. In order to permit
a c (0, -o.), I take a Box-Cox transformation of (2). This yields:
U(x,6) =118.x.
where x. = (x. - 1)/6 , 0 not equal to 6 < 1.
~-6
and x. =ln x. if6S = 0.
1 i
As I will be working with the case of less than perfect substitutability
between characteristics, I will, for notational simplicity, henceforth use the
(still CES) utility function:
6
U(x,e) =is:. (x. - 1) / 6 (3)
The price of a model depends upon its characteristics. I specify the
functional form for P(x). In particular,
P(x) = exp(a + S'x) (4)
where a > 0 and S=(S , P2 * '''an ) > 0 are parameters.
Denoting the homogeneous numeraire good by N and exogenous income by Y,
the consumers problem is to:
Max U(x,e) + N
x,N (5)
subject to P(x) + N 5 Y.
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The additively separable form of the utility function in (5) and the linearity
in N implies that the optimal choice of auto characteristics is independent of
income. The first order conditions for (5) imply:
6-1e.x. = . exp( 'x + a) (6)
1 1 1
at an optimum x
Equation (6) can be solved for the unobservable taste parameters in terms
of observables. As in Feenstra (1986), it proves to be very useful to do so.
I find:
e. = (x.) . exp(W'x + a) (7)
1 1. 1
* *
I next define a surplus function S(x,x ) = U(x,x ) - p(x). This function
gives the surplus associated with a model having characteristics vector x if
the consumer's optimal choice is described by x*. Simple'substitution gives:
* * 1 * 1- 6
S(x,x ) = exp(O'x + a) E [-i--] (xi) (x. -1) exp(5'x + a)(8)
It is easy to verify that S is maximized when x = x*. This surplus function
will serve as the metric for measuring distance in characteristics space.
Having defined the metric, I turn now to the task of using this metric to
determine which products compete with one another. (i.e. which are neighbors)
While there are many models of automobiles, and hence many available bundles of
characteristics, there is not a continuum of products available on the market.
Thus, a consumer may find that her optimal model, x*, does not exist in the
market. In this case, the consumer receives less surplus than she would if x*
had been available. In Figure 2, I illustrate an iso-surplus contour for a
typical consumer for the case of 2 characteristics. In the figure, S(x,x) is
constant along any contour and S(x,x) decreases as one moves away from x*.
Thus, the consumer whose optimal characteristics bundle is x* is indifferent
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between point A which entails slightly more horsepower and less weight and
point B which gives relatively much more horsepower and a heavier auto.
Two models A and B would be neighbors if there is any consumer who is
indifferent between A and B who prefers these two to all other models.
Graphically, in Figure 2, A and B would not be neighbors-if there existed a
model such as C.
Different consumers may have different ideal models. Because of this,
there are many iso-surplus contours that will pass through any two models.
*
In Figure 3, individual 1 has an optimal choice of x1 , and A and B lie on the
same iso-surplus contour--S. Another consumer, individual 2, has an optimal
*
choice of x 2 . For this consumer, A and B also lie on the same iso-surplus
contour (S 2 ). The analogous story applies to consumer 3 whose optimal choice
*
is x3 .
An ideal algorithm for determining neighbors would proceed in steps. For
every possible pair of models in the sample, one would conduct a detailed grid
search in characteristics space. At every point in the grid search, one would
pose the following question. Is the consumer whose ideal model is this point
in characteristics space indifferent to the 2 potential neighbors. If the
answer is no, move on to the next point on the grid and repeat the question.
If the answer is yes, ask if any of the other 98 models in the sample give
higher surplus than the pair being considered. If the answer here is no, the
pair of potential neighbors are indeed neighbors.
This algorithm will determine which multi-dimensionally differentiated
products are neighbors. Unfortunately, the algorithm is computationally
infeasible for the case of automobiles. This is because I find that at least 5
characteristics are necessary to adequately account for differentiation between
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autos. The algorithm described above, then, would require very many
5-dimensional grid searches entailing many calculations at each point in each
search. This is too expensive on a mainframe computer and too time consuming
on an advanced personal computer.
I refir.e the. above definition of neighbors. (Two models were neighbors if
there existed a consumer indifferent between them and who preferred them to all
other available models.) Amending this definition allows me to derive a
'computationally feasible method for determining neighbors to each model in my
sample. I take the smallest iso-surplus contour containing the potential
neighbors as the basis for comparison. In Figure 3, this is S1-- the surplus
that consumer 1 obtains. This is akin to saying that it is the preferences of
the consumer whose optimal bundle is most similar to the potential neighbors
that, on the margin, matter. In diagram 3, then, when I ask if A and B are
neighbors, I use the preferences of consumer 1 and then look for a point such
as C that lies within S1 . If a point such as C exists, A and B are not
.neighbors. This method is economically sound if it will always be the case
that if ccnsumer 1 has a model preferred to A and B, so will all other
consumers. There exist examples in which this will not be true, and this issue
will be discussed in detail. First, though, it is convenient to state a
working definition of "neighbors."
Definition: Models A and B are considered neighbors if, for the smallest
iso-surplus contour containing both of them:





This is, I believe, an economically intuitive and computationally
straightforward definition of neighbors. It is not a perfect definition -for at
least two reasons. I discuss each in turn.
The first problem with the definition of neighbors concerns identifying
the x* which defines the highest surplus associated with indifference between
models A and B. Recall that x* is a consumer's optimal choice of
characteristics and as such is not observed. I posit that x* is the midpoint
of a line drawn between two potential neighbors, A and B, where the surplus
function provides the metric. Since a model is represented by a vector of its
characteristics, I find x* by varying 9 from 0 to 1 until x* = Ox, + (1-n )x,
and S(xA,x*) = S(x$,x*). If iso-surplus contours were proper ellipsoids, the
x* defined in the above linear fashion would indeed identify the smallest iso-
surplus contour containing A and B. Insofar as the iso-surplus contours
defined by (8) are not proper ellipses, defining x* as the mid-surplus point on
the line between points A and B may not'yield the smallest contour containing A
and B.
There are two possible responses to this critique. First, the iso-surplus
contours defined by (8) are, in fact, not too different from ellipses for the
case of automobiles. Iso-surplus contours derived from data are drawn in
weight-horsepower space in figure 4. Due to the symmetry-of (8), contours are
similarly shaped in the'space of any two characteristics. Second, if x* was
poorly defined by drawing a line between A and B, one would expect the method
to yield nonsensical sets of neighbors. I show in the next section that this
is not the case. 22
A second problem is that this definition of neighbors which uses the
smallest iso-surplus contour as the basis for comparison may falsely reject
potential neighbors. This is demonstrated in Figure 5.
19
"" "*.*+ t1 It 9 "4444 dxxxx \f\ \ NN.%N
"S" " 1 1 i itIf "" C04 O 7Kx 31C3w%\\f\ \\
9 " 1I It t991 f"*"4" O CC x N%.\N\\f NNN% \\'%
" 1* t It i. ' "."*"* C0 K X x f \f N \N\NN\: \\ \NCN I
* It If i , "i " . CC C x f\\%N%. 2=32123= f\\
9 i9ofIt "i " = C 7K }C \\\\\ Z 1 = 2=Z Z= NZ \ ]It 9 11 t9l " " CC C 70X~X \\ \\ 32=32 312=Z \\%.%
Ittteo " ".. 000 X NNN 221221 Z Z2123 \\
t 119If " ^.. X >< 3Cx \ f\ \ =%23 3 Z1211 =2212 S
It"99 " .. 00 1X~x w Z=3213212=21213332 \ \
"3 .. + 0c x xx NNf N 332 =3312 12323322. \
" "4"4" 000x NtN 232'?222 32 12 =3x21 f
9944400 0 M x f\\ 22223=1o21"o2121122
"...000 xxx N\\ N3 32332212212212112:1 %.N
" O ~ ~ %.N3 12121171 21 of " Z 2 %.
4*4CCOO wXX \ N% g%. 32122122. 21222o SS St
.44 0 .0 %N \ 2 31233.13 040 . 12712-
.. x c Ax \f\\ Z 2312 04 4*0*0o*aO*"" 2=
4C 0C~XM \\\ 323233 00.."60 040*.. 5125
.C Co NNN%\=z =s= o 1337i"21t w 4 e *4 0 \233 \N
x x 2 2x22 *9*'*..ab0 020 N
O x0}C xNx 222= 2: 33.3 0 00" ao;O aa * 6 223
X CC xxCx N. N\ Z Z21222 5 e 9*f ! 3440Z04Z*321
020 x NNNNs 3= 2242 004fe44e440** 23
C x x x x N\ NN211 353210 6 o oes f i 11f®"s 2Z N
00 w\\N 3332=331 *oeso soooo6 " 12 N
00 x x \\\\ ==121 31* boo~to..o.ooo 123 N
x x% x N %%. N2 2 = = s do2e" 32 322
x x x NNN\ 2 3 2 3 2 *4 00 0 0 a o "O a43N
xxxx ff~f 335 22 ooo.4044o44oo*3212
xCsr Xx N\\NNN 5321213 2 4ss4*4e*e04* 0404o4 S2-2 N
*xxx \ 223271 *000 40 6a040042Z2 N
** X .N\\\ 23222 33533 1f a o 4 a 0ao**403 2 21f
xxx*\\\\\\23212322 0804*44*44O O4/522 %N
X U N\ \\ \ 33 32 2 3 2 e s oa a 0 b4Q o 0a02213 \\
'31x \ \ \ 72NNN 120o = \Ot NKxW \\ \ 33722 2 33 se a as "o44o 35 3 %.
xx x \\\\\ 2 3=312= 2 3 O""4o4s4*4o 0=1221
NNNNN\\ \\\Z 3232322235 a o 34* 2*o 1 \21 t
x -x x NxNxN\\\N 2 S3 3 3 2 3 3 *44454302 4 3 2 1 Z 1ZN\ Nx
at NNNNN\\\\\ 2212 2%44?723'_ .121'?2\\\
*xx \NNNN N.=32332332233232123132=12 \NN
xxx x x \ NNf2 232323333323222323 \\\'N
x * x \\ f \ 2 33 Z3. 3 2 S Z 3x 3 ZN \\ x
0 xx xx \\\\N \ Z Z Z3 z 3 .9312 -z T 2 NNN \
C' X X].NN\\N fNN 222232232 722=Z2 s,\NN E
































































0 "" .""""". 4.
Z4 I-' C C O '4 t r r^ " u+ 1 LC Cn
C . ' r s .T ' + 1r' .+.. 7 ? T o * .? = . .f r ^ V - 7 ? T J J ' J



























Suppose there are only 3 models, A, B, and C. My definition of neighbors
rules out A and B as potential neighbors, since the iso-surplus contour drawn
is the smallest containing A and B and C is preferred to A and B. Yet for a
consumer whose optimum is x*' , A and B are neighbors. My method for
determining neighbors, though, will never account for the preferences of a
consumer with an optimal choice of x* ' in Figure 5. Because I find the optimum
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bundle by drawing a line between 2 models, and do so for all pairs in the
sample, I will never account for the preferences of a consumer whose optimum
bundle lies outside the outermost envelope of available models. The
preferences of these consumers are ignored. In figure 5, this envelope'is
defined by the triangle ABC-- an area which does not include q'.
For the automobile market, this problem is not likely to be an empirically
important one. This is because, in a market with as many models as the auto
market, it is unlikely that there are very many consumers whose ideal lies
outside this outer envelope. Were this the case, one would expect such
profitable market niches to be readily filled.
The algorithm for finding neighbors, then, is as follows.
Step 1: Find x' such that S(x),x') = S(x 2 ,x*) using the above described
linear method.
Step 2: See if there exists a model j not equal to 1,2 such that
S(xa,x*) < S(x,x*). Models 1 and 2 are neighbors if no such j exists in the
sample.
Step 3: Repeat the above two steps for all possible pairs in the sample.
This algorithm ensures that.if 1 is a neighbor of 2, then 2 is a neighbor of 1.
If 3 is a neighbor to 2, though, it need not be a neighbor to (2's neighbor) 1.
The number of neighbors a model has depends on its characteristics and the
characteristics of the other models in the sample. The actual number of
neighbors for each model is endogenous and will differ across models.
This procedure yields the neighbor(s) to every model in the sample. I use
these neighbors as the elements of Pin the demand equation (1). Conversely,
models which are not neighbors are assumed to have no cross price effect in
(1).
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This concludes the description of the methodology. In this section, I
have explained how I use results from a Lancasterian model of product
_differentiation to derive an estimable demand function. The resulting demand
function circumvents many of the myriad problems that plagued earlier attempts
to estimate the demand for differentiated products--specifically automobiles.
IV. Data and Results.
- The data s-et comprises almost all automobile models which were sold in
calender years 1983 - 1985. Specialty models with annual sales of under 4000
were excluded (e. g. Ferrari and Rolls Royce). Models which were not produced
for all of each of the three years were also deleted. This allows me to avoid
the problems that would be posed by a model which is introduced in October and
hence has very low annual sales for the calender (as opposed to model) year. A.
similar, though less severe, problem would exist for models withdrawn after
October. Models included in the sample are given in Table 1. Each model/year
observation consists of the following variables.
1) Sales by Nameplate
2) Suggested retail list price for the base model





8) Headroom " it
9) Legroom "
10) Number of engine cylinders of the base model.
11) Engine displacement
12) Fuel injection or carburation "
13) Manual or automatic transmission "
14) Power or manual steering"
15) Power or manual brakes "
16) Air conditioning as standard on the base model.
17) Horsepower (HP) of the base model
18) Turning radius"
19) Country of origin.
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All data were collected from issues of Automotive News' annual Market Data Book
Issue.
Some variables of economic significance are absent from the above list.
In particular, I lack data on the incomes of consumers and on the actual
transaction price. I use the suggested list price of the base model for Pit.-2
This introduces systematic bias in so-far as some models consistently sell for
more or less than list price. For some Japanese models, this may have been the
.case in my sample.1 4
I compute neighbors for the 1984 models. I assume that product
characteristics do not change so much that neighbors change over the sample
period. I will relax and test this assumption in future work. Indeed,
computing neighbors for each year provides an alternative test of Feenstra' s
(1985) upgrading results. Here, differential upgrading would take the form of
changing neighborhoods over time.
I begin by estimating the hedonic price equation P(x). Like most
researchers before me15 , I find that the functional form of P(x) which best
fits the data is:16
P(x) = exp (a + S'x). (4)
I find that a linear combination of the following five characteristics accounts
for almost 90 percent of the variation of P(x)--weight, horsepower,and dummies
for power steering, air conditioning, and foreign. Dummy variables take the
value of 2 if a car is foreign, and if air and power steering are standard and
a value of 1 otherwise. This differs from the usual 1-0 convention because
23
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some dummies are raised to negative powers. The only effect of this change is
to alter the constant term in the hedonic regression. Numerical experiments
show that this has no effect on the determination of neighbors. I estimate the
log of equation (4) to give:
In P = .215 + .209 Weight + .0045 HP + .1261 PS + .4703 Air + .161 Foreign (9)
(.123) (.056) (.0009) (.052) (.050) (.044)
standard errors are in parentheses.
100 observations. R2 = .885
It is useful to view dummy variables here as proxies for various degrees of
luxury and/or quality. Hence an optimal choice of characteristics, x*, may
involve .5 units of air conditioning. This jrst means that the consumer would
prefer less luxury than is imposed by the all or nothing choice of air
conditioning but more than is afforded by a no-air model. The coefficients in
(9) are used to parameterize the surplus function of equation (8). While the
coefficients'are subject to measurement error, their very small standard errors
argue that neglecting this error is unlikely to be an empirically relevant
omission.
The only remaining unknown in the surplus function is the parameter 6 which
is related to the degree of concavity of the utility function. Recall that the
elasticity of substitution, a = 1/ (6-1). This parameter is not identifiable
with the data available. Following Feenstra (1986), I posit many different
values for 6 and replicate the entire methodology from the beginning for each
of these. I find that the choice of 6 over a wide range of plausible values
does not affect the qualitative results. I consider values of
6 = .5, -1, -3, -6, and -8. Only at values of -8 and below do results change
substantially. That is, the choice of neighbors is mostly unaffected until
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6= -8. At -8, neighbors become much more numerous and, to a degree, counter-
intuitive.
Once 6 has been specified, I compute neighbors for every model using the
1984 data.17  The results for 6= -3 are given. in Table 2. Table 2, for
example, tells us that the neighbors of the Honda Accord,'model 13, are the
Toyota Camry, Nissan Stanza, Mazda 626, Mitsubishi Tredia and Cordia, Chevrolet
Cavalier, and Pontiac Sunbird. An intuitive way of interpreting Table 2 is to
note that it answers the question: What other autos did the consumer consider
before she decided to purchase the one actually selected?
In addition to varying 6, another type of sensitivity test was conducted in
calculating neighbors. Because iso-surplus contours are not perfect ellipses,
the linear method of finding the optimal mode) x* is, as noted above, only an
approximation. I used another approximation and re-tested for neighbors. This
other approximation was based on finding x* such that consumers whose ideal
models were A and B were equally dissatisfied with x*. This approximation
yielded the same qualitative results as the linear approximation of x*.
The next step in the methodology is to estimate the demand functions given in
(lA) and (1B). Models have, on average, about 6 neighbors. With 100 models,
this implies 600 cross price terms to be estimated. While this is certainly an
improvement over the previous 9900 terms, the demand functions are still not
accurately estimable with only 300 observations. I take the mean price of
neighbors as the observation for P,,. Similarly, I take the mean
characteristics of neighbors as the observation for X,,. Because the demand
functions use the log of P,,, it matters that the average of the logs is not
the log of the averages. Numerical experiments show that this approximation
does not affect results. There are other specifications for P,,. Recall that
26
Table 2






















































































































































































































19 42 44 80
16 45






16 20 24 31 41 53
12 31 53
17 18 22 23 31 100
32 33 81
23 32 57 69 81 82 88
20 34
1 18 19 56 100
17 1 22 51 61 94
1
24 30 34 35 41 54 62 98
27 37
39 55 61 100
31 40 76
31 35 40 76
27 92
38 68 85
28 74 75 79 92 93
74 77 78
40
12 23 24 76
33 81 95
39




































































































































































































20 34 49 54 73 91 92
10 53 70 76 84
47 60 73 75 92
44 1 51
18 50
4 46 53 82
10 11 45 48 52 70
20 34 47 58 73 91 92
22- 39 61 95
17 18 22 61 80
15 '63 70 71 82
20 34 54 62 92 98
41 43 64
34 49 65 67 75 92
17 18 22 55 56 80 94




7 68 77 79
5 65 66 79
26 66 78 85
15 32 81 88 95
48 53 57 71 82 84
57 63 70 84 89
41 76 86 98
47 49 91
27 28 77 79 93
27 49 65 92 93
23 24 31 40 43 48 83 92 96 97 98
28 66 74 78 79
28 68 77
27 28 66 67 74 77 93
42 56 61 1 94
4 13 15 32 69 82
4 15 52 57 70 81
41 64 76 96 98
48 70 71 76 89
26 38 68
20 41 72 76 90
43 91 92 99
15 69 70 95
71 84 97
41 43 76 86 99
54 73 87 92
25 27 49 54 58 60 75 76
27 74 75 79
18 44 61 80 1
15 32 55 69 88
76 83 97
76 89 96
20 41 58 72 76 83
41 43 87 90
7 12 14 17 22
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the estimated demand equation is just a converient statistical representation.
Perhaps Pt should be the average price of neighbors weighted by their sales.
This representation of P,, yields the same cualitative results, but standard
errors on the parameters in the demand function are larger.
I estimate (1A) and (1B) using OLS. Because (1B) is nested within (1A), a
straightforward F-test is used to test which specification should be used.
That is, I test to see if own and neighbor's =ean characteristics are jointly
statistically significant.1 8 , 1 9 For all values of d tested, the data cannot
reject the hypothesis that own and neighbors' characteristics are jointly
insignificant.
The existence of multicollinearity in (LA) is confirmed by collinearity
diagnostics following the approach of Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980).
Singular Value Decomposition analysis indicates multicollinearity. The SVD
analysis does not indicate that the data matrix 4s so ill-conditioned as to
suggest numerical error in the estimates. Due to the multicollinearily in
(1A), estimated standard errors are inflated. This biases the F-test toward
rejecting joint statistical significance of own and neighbors' mean
characteristics. I nonetheless accept the results of the F-tests and use (1B)
as the demand function in the analysis that follows. Table 7 in the Appendix
presents the results of instead using (1A). As the collinearity diagnostics
indicated, results are very similar to those obtained using (1B) (and given in
Table 4), except that standard errors are inflated.
OLS estimates of (1B) are presented in Table 3. In Table 3, equation 3.1
presents estimates of the demand function excluding any cross price effects.
This equation is roughly a panel data version of the older time-series studies
which neglected cross-price effects. Equation 3.1 gives a highly significant
total market elasticity of demand of - .794. This estimate is in line with
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existing, older estimates. Equation 3.1, though, is misspecified, as cross-
price effects are omitted.
Equations 3.2 to 3.6 in Table 3 give estimates when the demand function
includes the price of neighbors, hence allowing'for the possibility of
substitution. Varying 6 from .5 to -6 affects the significance of the
parameters on own and neighbor's price but the point estimates are fairly
constant. (Recall that the choice of & only enters the demand function via its
effect on the determination of the set of neighbors.) For 6 = .5, -1, -3 and
-6, the coefficient on neighbor's price is highly significant. For these
values of 6, the coefficient on own price is somewhat stable across equations
and is highly significant.
For values of 6 between -1 and -6, the total market elasticity (a + a2)
varies from -. 81 to -. 83 - -all of which are statistically significant at the
90% level. As theory would lead one to expect, allowing for substitutability
leads to a more elastic own price elasticity. This is evidenced by own price
elasticities (al) greater in absolute value than the coefficient of -. 794 in
equation 3.1.
In sum, the "neighbors" approach to restricting the dimensionality of the
demand function in conjunction with a short panel of data seems to fit the data
remarkably well. I have completed some sensitivity analyses in the spirit of
Learner (1985). These ad hoc specification tests include using other hedonic
characteristics to control for cross sectional variation. The results have




Standard Errors in Parentheses
Variable Definitions:
LOGSALE - Log of sales in 1000's.
LOGLIST - Log of the list price in $iOO00's
LOGPN - Log 'o f the average price of the neighbors in $000.
D84 - 1 if the year is 1984 , 0 otherwise.
















Dependent Variable is LOGSAILE
Eqn. (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6)















-. 7942 -1.814 -1.333 -2.076 -2.271 -. 912






















.111 .118 .122 .120 .108
.161 - .173 .178 .179 .155
-1.350 -1.316 -1.228 -1.181
(.245) (. 252) (.246) (.244)
-1.302
(.254)
-. 607 -. 570 .578 - .594 -. 529
(.11 ) (. 12) .11928
-. 615 -. 843 - .537 - .424
(. 183) (.189) (.193) (.196) (.183)
.3976.4349 .4022 .4330 .445 0
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V. On the Enpirics of Taxation Schemes for Differentiated Products.
The methodology by which the demand functions in Table 3 were derived was
based on Lancasterian consumer theory. That theory tells us that not all
differentiated products need be substitutes. It also tells us to group
products according to their characteristics and not only, as the Armington
Assuzption implies, according to their country of origin. 20  The elasticities
that are estimated in the equations of Table 3, then, are the relevant ones
from the vantage point of consumer theory.
Trade policy, though, typically taxes a good based on its country of origin.
The analysis of trade policy issues requires trade elasticities. I derive
these elasticities from the estimates of the demand system provided in Sections
III and.IV. This is accomplished by perturbing the system on whatever margin
trade policy operates to simulate the elasticity relevant to the study of trade
taxes. This approach is more likely to give valid elasticities than direct
estimation of import demand equations (see, for example Leamer and Stern),
because it is based on a utility-consistent framework for demand.
Suppose, for example, that policy makers wish to know how the demand for
domestic autos changes when a tariff is applied to al auto imports.
To derive this elasticity, I increase the price of all foreign cars by one
percent--my proxy for a small change. This increases the demand for models of
domestic autos which have as neighbors some foreign model. Summing the new
demand for all domestic autos gives the information needed to construct the
relevant elasticity.
This approach requires a caveat. I have nothing to say about the effect of
large taxes. This is because the estimated demand system is only a local
representation of demand. The system may behave quite differently at a point
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far from the initial situation. This is a standard warning in the empirical
tax analysis literature. Also, here, large taxes may change the neighbors of a
model. I assume that the taxes I consider are small enough that neighbors do
not change. Preliminary numerical experiments indicate that this is indeed the
case for the one percent price changes .I consider.
In Table 4, I give a wide variety of elasticities corresponding to various
policy scenarios. For each elasticity, I also give its standard error. This
statistic is computable given the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates
of the initial demand equation. These elasticities all are simulated using the
demand equation (3.4). That is, 6 from the utility function is set to -3. I
take this as a central case for expositional purposes. Appendix A presents the
same elasticities when the entire methodology is conducted using other values
of 6. That appendix shows that results remain qualitatively similar for a
range of 6's.
Table 4 is easily interpreted. The table shows, for example, that the
elasticity of demand for domestically produced automobiles with respect to the
price of Japanese autos is .187. That is, a one percent increase in the price
of all Japanese cars (via a tariff perhaps) yields a .187 percent increase in
demand for domestically produced autos. Were such a price increase applied to
all imported autos, demand for domestically produced autos would rise instead
by .367 percent. This example illustrates an error present in earlier studies
of U.S. - Japanese auto trade policy. These studies used an imputed elasticity
of demand for domestic autos with respect to a foreign price change. This is
because there were no estimates available of elasticities of domestic demand
with respect to a change in only the Japanese price. Table 4 tells us
33
Table 4
Elasticities 'of.Demand using Eq. lB
6 = -3










































































that this error leads one to believe that demand for domestic autos is twice as
responsive to a small tariff on Japanese cars than is actually the case. The
difference arises due to substitution by American consumers away from Japanese
cars toward other foreign cars not affected by the trade policy.
Suppose that the purpose of trade or industrial policy in the U.S.
automobile industry is to increase demand for domestically produced autos.
Table 4 shows that a tax on all imports has less that half the effect on
domestic demand than an equal subsidy on domestic models would have (.367 v.
-1.187). (Consequences for government revenue are, of course, quite
different.) An increase in a tariff on Swedish autos has very little effect on
domestic demand. The relevant elasticity is .034. This is because most of the
neighbors to Swedish autos are also foreign.
Suppose that the purpose of trade taxes is to reduce imports from a specific
country. Then Table 4 shows that a tax on only Swedish cars reduces Swedish
imports by relatively less than the same tariff on German autos. Swedish cars
are the most elastically demanded import, followed by German models, then
Japanese models (-1.97 v. -1.71 v. -1.43). This is because Japanese models
have many Japanese neighbors, while this is not the case for Swedish models.
Indeed, most neighbors to Swedish models are German. This is evidenced by the
relatively high cross price elasticities between German and Swedish autos.
Perhaps contrary to prior beliefs, a tax on all imports would have roughly
the same relative impact on Japanese, German, and Swedish producers.
Some economists have argued for a tax on all small foreign cars instead of a-
tax on Japanese autos. Such a tax does not discriminate on the basis of
country of origin and is viewed more kindly by GATT. I arbitrarily define
small cars to be those weighing under 2300 pounds. (For purposes of
comparison, a Toyota Tercel weighs 1985 lbs., a Honda Accord 2187 lbs., and a
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Saab 900 2612 lbs.) While such a broadly based tax might make a Trade
Representative's job more easy, the policy is only half* (.096 v. .187) as
effective as is a direct tax on imports at increasing demand for domestically
produced autos. Swedish producers are totally unaffected by such a tax since
no Swedish export to the U.S. weighs less than 2300 lbs. (there is a reason
Volvos are so safe), and no Swedish car has a neighbor weighing less than 2300
lbs.
It is possible to investigate the effects of various other trade and
industrial policies using Table 4. The above scenarios provide only a
beginning.
VI. Summary
This paper has developed a new methodology for investigating empirically the
effects of taxes on differentiated products. The approach adopted a
Lancasterian, utility-consistent view of product differentiation. Using this
approach, I calculated which multidimensionally differentiated products were
neighbors. This information proved a useful basis for decreasing the
dimensionality of the demand estimation problem. Using a panel of 100
automobile models over 3 years, a demand function was estimated. This yielded
quite reasonable and statistically significant demand elasticities.
Recognizing that tax policy often acts on a different margin than consumer
theory, the demand elasticities necessary for tax policy analyses were
simulated.. This provided the first estimated set of such elasticities. These
elasticities provide some insight into a number of possible policy scenarios.
The methodology developed in this paper provides ample opportunities for
Leaner-type ad-hoc specification tests. Many of these are presented in the
Appendix. Results appear robust.
The elasticities estimated and given in Table 4 are well suited to
36
simulation analyses of strategic trade and industrial policies concerning the




Elasticities of Demand using Eq. 1B
6 = -1










































































Elasticities of Demand using Eq. 1B
6 = -6










































































Elasticities of Demand using Eq. 1A
6 = -3








































































1. See Dixit (1986) who argues this point.
2. See, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (:980).
3. Other simpler examples of this type of methodology are Johnson (1978) and
Cragg and Uhler (1970).
4. Demand for automobiles is the most prevalent example of modelling the
demand differentiated products. I am unaware of any modelling approach for
other differentiated products that is not mentioned in this section of the paper.
5. This is the most recent.data available until April 1987.
6. Note that this differs from the usual panel in which goods are the same,
but demand is across consumers and over time. Here, the consumers are assumed
the same, but goods differ across models, and these models are tracked over
time.
7. Actually, it is sufficient to include in the regression those
characteristics of which a linear combination account for the product
differentiation.
8. This differs from the Dixit-Stiglitz approach to product differentiation.
There, all products are neighbors.
9. The approach I use to find neighbors when products are multidimensionally
differentiated benefitted greatly from discussions with Rob Feenstra. I am
very grateful for his many helpful suggestions.
10. Recent theoretical work by Caplin and Nalebuff (1986) has also addressed
the issue of determining neighbors to a good when products are
multidimensionally differentiated. They show that if preferences can be
represented by a utility function that is Cobb-Douglas in product
characteristics and income, then there exists a straightforward way of finding
neighbors. Using the unit simplex in Cobb-Douglas parameter space, they show
that a hyperplane divides all consumers who prefer good x to good y form those
who prefer y to x. Because set of consumers who prefer one model to another
(i.e. the model's neighborhood) are defined by hyperplanes, finding neighbors
is a tractable problem. The tractability comes from the functional form of the
utility function. While this is an elegant result, it is not applicable to the
automobile market. This is because the utility function that permits the
tractability of the problem also implies that all consumers purchase the same
value of the most preferred model but differ in quantit-ies purchased. For big-
ticket items such as automobiles, this is just not the case.
11. This function over characteristics is sometimes referred to in the
literature as a sub-utility function.
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12. While I realize this line ofreasoning has strong Bayesian overtones, I do
not know another way of getting a feel for the validity of a new methodology.
This is another reason why the auto industry is a good candidate to which to
apply a new methodology. If my methodology were first applied to lumber and I
found Clear Pine-2 to be a neighbor to grade 3 Birch, few economists would have
any idea of how well neighbors are defined.
13. This is also the practice adopted by Feenstra (1985). In that paper,
Feenstra puts forth the argument that for national welfare considerations,
dealer mark-ups represent an intra-country transfer.
14. Implicit discounts due to selectively applied low financing rates have
also been ignored due to lack of data.
15. The most recent examples are Feenstra (1985) and (1986). Griliches is a
much earlier example.
16. I also estimate this function without logarithms. This functional form
yielded a loss of about .20 in the R2 .
17. This procedure is programmed in IBM Profortran for implementation on IBM-
compatible personal computers. The program is available to researchers on
request.
18. Throughout this paper, "statistically significant" means statistically
significant from zero at the 90% confidence level unless stated otherwise.
19. Because FOREIGN is a near linear combination of SWEDE, JAPAN, and GERMAN--
the fixed effects, I do not include FOREIGN in equation (lA) as an own
characteristic.
20. Indeed, demand estimation according to the Armington Assumption, using my
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